The Endogeneity of Association Agreements and their Impact on Trade for Eastern Countries: Empirical Evidence for Romania by Rault, Christophe et al.
 
  
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Endogeneity of Association Agreements and their 
Impact on Trade for Eastern Countries: 
Empirical Evidence for Romania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Christophe RAULT, Ana Maria SOVA and Robert SOVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 868 
April 2007 The Endogeneity of Association Agreements and their Impact on 
Trade for Eastern Countries: Empirical Evidence for Romania 
 
 
 
 
Christophe RAULT, 
LEO, University of Orleans and IZA
1 
 
Ana Maria SOVA, 
CES, Sorbonne University and A.S.E
2 
 
Robert SOVA, 
CES, Sorbonne University and A.S.E
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
The main goal of regionalization is the creation of free trade areas and the guarantee for 
countries to accede to a widened market. Many studies dealing with the effects of regional 
free trade agreements on trade flows already exist in the economic literature and the explosion 
of regional agreements among nations has recently stressed the key role of regionalization. 
However, the effects of agreements on trade have not yet been clearly determined in those 
studies. Our research in this paper aims at reassessing the genuine role of associations. For 
this matter, we particularly study the association of Romania with European Union countries. 
Our econometric analysis based on qualitative choice models highlights in particular why 
European countries chose to conclude an association agreement with Romania, and stresses 
the fact that European Union countries select endogenously the conclusion of association 
agreements. We also find a 0.29 positive impact of the association agreement on Romanian 
export performances.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
 
Globalization has already been the subject of various debates. It is now usual in 
literature to distinguish between two main streams: the former considers that a world with 
trade freedom is better than a world with tariff and non-tariff barriers. The latter suggests that 
some specific but limited tariff and non-tariff barriers are however preferable to a complete 
trade freedom. Actually, since the end of World War II it seems that this trade liberalization 
has developed more on a local  scale than on a global one and has led to the development of 
various free trade areas as for instance the European Economic Community, or the Free Trade 
European Association… 
 
Since the sixties Western Europe has been “the most interesting and successful 
regional liberalization process”. The nineties were the most appropriate period for a deeper 
economic integration. 
 
Many studies dealing with the effects of regional free trade agreements on trade flows 
already exist in the economic literature and the explosion of regional agreements among 
nations has recently stressed the key role of regionalization. However, the effects of 
agreements on trade have not yet been clearly determined in them. Our research in this paper 
aims at reassessing the genuine role of associations. For this matter, we first theoretically 
study the association of Romania with European Union countries (EU). Then, in our 
econometric analysis based on Probit models we proceed in two steps: we first try to find the 
main determinants that better characterize the European agreement using qualitative models. 
We then calculate the marginal effects that provide indications of the quantitative contribution 
of each determinant to the probability to conclude association agreements between countries. 
And finally, we try to determine the effects of association agreements on trade exchanges. We 
are particularly interested in the two following issues: (i) do European agreements have for 
main goal to increase the trade exchanges of their members and (ii) if so, how much? 
 
Our econometric analysis based on qualitative choice models highlights in particular 
why European countries chose to conclude an association agreement with Romania, and 
stresses the fact that European Union countries select endogenously the conclusion of 
association agreements. We also find a 0.29 positive impact of the association agreement on 
Romanian export performances.  
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 1.         INTRODUCTION 
 
   Globalization has already been the subject of various debates. It is now usual in 
literature to distinguish between two main streams: the former considers that a world with 
trade freedom is better than a world with tariff and non-tariff barriers. The latter suggests that 
some specific but limited tariff and non-tariff barriers are however preferable to a complete 
trade freedom. Actually, since the end of World War II it seems that this trade liberalization 
has developed more on a local  scale than on a global one and has led to the development of 
various free trade areas as for instance the European Economic Community, or the Free Trade 
European Association… 
Since the sixties Western Europe has been “the most interesting and successful 
regional liberalization process”
4. The nineties were the most appropriate period for a deeper 
economic integration. 
Many studies dealing with the effects of regional free trade agreements on trade flows 
already exist in the economic literature and the explosion of regional agreements among 
nations has recently stressed the key role of regionalization. However, the effects of 
agreements on trade have not yet been clearly determined in them. Our research in this paper 
aims at reassessing the genuine role of associations. For this matter, we first theoretically 
study the association of Romania with European Union countries (EU). Our econometric 
analysis based on qualitative choice models highlights why European countries have chosen 
to conclude an association agreement with Romania,  and stresses the fact that European 
Union countries have selected endogenously the conclusion of association agreements. In this 
perspective we proceed in two steps: we first try to find the main determinants that better 
characterize the European agreement using qualitative models (probit). We then calculate the 
marginal effects that provide indications of the quantitative contribution of each determinant 
to the probability to conclude association agreements between countries. And finally, we try 
to determine the effects of association agreements on trade exchanges. We are particularly 
interested in the two following issues: (i) do European agreements have for main goal to 
increase the trade exchanges of their members and (ii) if so, how much? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we address the 
European agreements and we briefly review their main determinants in section 3. In section 4 
                                                 
4 Ana Paula Silva (2001) « EU Enlargement and Trade Adjustments ».   4
and 5 we report our empirical investigation as well as our econometric results and we discuss 
their policy implications. Finally we summarize the paper’s major findings in section 6.  
2.         EUROPEAN AGREEMENTS  
   Since the nineties Western Europe has had to face the economic and political changes 
of Eastern Europe. The main concern of Western Europe has been the creation of a 
framework aiming at facilitating and strengthening the gradual economic and political 
integration with Central and Eastern Europe. The solution retained has been to propose a 
former European policy: Preferential trade relationships were established as «  European 
Agreements», or «Association agreements» in the early nineties. 
All candidate countries signed Association agreements with the European Union (EU), 
establishing the creation of a free trade area, dialogue modalities between governments and 
community institutions.  
These agreements were signed
5 on bilateral bases having a political and economic motivation. 
The impact of regional blocks on trade flows has already been the subject of an important 
literature.  
   Some of the econometric results reported in these studies were contradictory, even 
concerning the European Community (EC). For instance, researchers like Aitken (1973), or 
Abrams (1980) found that the EC had a significant impact on the trade exchanges of 
community members. On the contrary, Bergstrand (1985) found an insignificant effect. 
Besides, Frankel (1997) found a significant but negative effect of the agreement impact for 
EC members, because intra-European trade can be explained by " various natural factors with 
little role of EC until 1980". These diverging results can be explained by the potential 
endogeneity bias of the agreement variable.  
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) tried to test the robustness of the regional agreement 
variable effect by using cross section data. They suggest that its effect may be over- or under-
estimated due of the potential endogeneity of this variable. Besides, they stressed that 
countries select endogenously the conclusion of regional agreements according to 
determinants which sometimes are not all observable and measurable by econometricians. 
                                                 
5  Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Romania (1993), The Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993), Bulgaria 
(1993), Latvia (1995), Estonia (1995), Lithuania (1995),  Slovenia (1995). 
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These findings are confirmed by Baier and Bergstrand (2005) who pointed out that the 
regional agreement variable is not exogenous and the estimation of a gravity model using 
cross section data for investigating the quantitative effect of this variable on trade flows can 
be biased because of unobservable heterogeneity or/and omitted variables. 
 
We now try in the next section to identify more precisely the main determinants that 
characterize better European agreements. 
 3.         THE MAIN DETERMINANTS OF ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
The analysis of the effect of regional integration agreements was considerably 
enriched not only with mechanisms involving scale economies, the location of firms, but also 
with the non-economic gains of regional integration. Non-economic objectives are also the 
reasons for the conclusion of regional agreements. A political stability in the agreement zone, 
the intensification of democracy, a guarantee of policy irreversibility, a higher security, a 
power of negotiation increased with third parties, are variables, which can be determinants for 
the explanation of an agreement conclusion.  
De Melo et al. (1993) showed that regional agreements allow to implement the most effective 
policies within the passage of the national framework to the regional framework since the 
power of lobbies is in this case more reduced. Integration agreements oblige political 
decision-makers to implement the institutions of countries already members and to give up to 
the former. Moreover decision taking at a regional level takes better the needs of the various 
countries into account. 
The irreversibility of economic policies is guaranteed because trade agreements do not 
allow governments to implement a discretionary policy or to implement again a protectionist 
trade policy
6. Then, agreements make irreversible domestic reforms of economic policies. 
Regional agreements have increasing effects on the negotiation power of members with third 
countries and permit faster trade liberalization than within the multilateral framework. 
Concerning “the security capital” of a country, it symbolizes confidence in the neighboring 
country. Indeed, according to Schiff and Winters (1998) the security capital of a country 
represents the consumers’ utility function and positively depends on imports from the nearby 
country. Consequently, the higher imports are, the higher confidence is in the nearby country. 
  
                                                 
6 Fernandez and Portes (1998).   6
Free trade agreements are not exogenous. Baier and Bergstrand (2005) noticed that 
very few theoretical and empirical works exist examining the determinants of the conclusion 
of agreements. Moreover they developed a theoretical and econometric specification to put in 
evidence the endogeneity of regional agreements using economic and political instruments. 
The pairs of countries that signed an agreement tend to share common economic 
characteristics associated with an important trade and with a net trade creation that determines 
welfare growth. Regional agreements like every regional policy are actually an endogenous 
potential variable. The bias resulting from not considering this variable as endogenous is an 
important question that was neglected in literature. According to the authors this endogeneity 
bias can be the consequence of omitted variables that can be connected to the Regional 
Agreement variable.   
Krugman (1991) showed that countries that try to conclude an agreement are natural 
commercial partners and are close from a geographic point of view. 
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002) introduced a theoretical and econometric model 
showing that because of the conclusion of an agreement, a government becomes more 
democratic and its leaders have higher profits through trade liberalization.  
There exist different sets of factors determining the decision of the two governments 
to conclude an agreement. For instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2005) mentioned the 
importance of political variables and pointed out that a regional agreement is more likely to 
emerge when governments are more democratic.     
Having now reviewed economic and non economic gains, and given that the regional 
agreement variable is not exogenous, we propose in the next section to estimate an 
econometric model that highlights the determinants of a regional agreement concluded 
between countries with a different development level. We are particularly interested in 
identifying the main reasons for the conclusion of an association agreement between the 
Romanian government and EU countries.   
 4.    ECONOMETRIC  INVESTIGATION   
 
The agreement can be modeled by a parametric form using a model of qualitative choice.  The   7
data used span a 18 year period (from 1987 to 2004), and cover a sample of 19 OECD 
countries
7  organized in a panel framework (country, partner, year). 
Our binary qualitative model shows that Romania’s decision of economic and political 
integration into EU is influenced by two categories of economic and non economic variables.  
  
The PROBIT model permits to take the decision-making process into account and to 
examine the contribution of the various determinants to this process. 
From economic and political conditions we found convenient to use 5 explanatory variables 
that characterize better the association process to EU. These variables are the following: 
¾  the difference between the GDP per capita of the partner countries (DGDPijt), 
reflecting a relative factor endowment in terms of GDP per capita (GDPi,j/POPi,j) 
(source : CHELEM, CEPII Data Base); 
¾  the geographic distance between the capitals of partner countries (Distij),              
reflecting a proxy for transport costs (source : CEPII Data Base); 
¾  the traditional trade relations between countries (Reltradij), (author’s calculus using 
data from   CHELEM, CEPII Data Base); 
¾  the political stability of countries (Stabpoli), (source : Freedom House); 
¾  Foreign direct investments (Invijt), (source: OECD Database). 
 
The econometric specification used is the following:  
 
 Accijt = a0+ a1log(DGDPijt)+a2log(Distij)+a3Reltradij+a4Stabpolit +a5log(Invijt)+ εijt            (1) 
, where Accijt  denotes the association agreement between Romania and EU countries 
(endogenous variable), εijt  is the error term  which is assumed to be normally distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance for all observations. 
We first determine the qualitative influence of the explanatory variables (cf. table 1, 
column 1) and then calculate the marginal effects (cf. column 2). 
 
                                                 
7 France, Belgium and Luxemburg, Germany, Italy, Holland , England, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia, the United States of America.   8
The numerical value of the estimated parameters reported in table 1, column 1 is not 
directly interpretable. The only really useful information is the sign of parameters that 
indicates whether the associated variable influences positively or negatively the dependent 
variable.  
   The results of the estimation of the association agreement indicate that some of the 
variable coefficients are positive and others negative. 
The lack of the similarity of the economies entails that the variable of economic distance 
(DGDPijt) has a negative impact on the decision of association agreement. The more the 
economic distance of countries lowers, the more the countries tend to conclude an agreement. 
For this variable the coefficient sign is negative. 
Traditional trade relationships (Reltradij) have the role to stimulate partners’ interest 
for the association. Geographic distance (Distij) is generally an obstacle in the decision of 
association, as it is also confirmed by the negative sign in the above estimation. The closer the 
countries are, the higher the probability is to conclude an association agreement. 
To calculate marginal effects we proceed to another estimation in which variable 
coefficients indicate the contribution of the different variables in the decision of association 
agreement. Our results are reported in table 1, column 2. 
Table 1: Estimations of the determinants of the association decision. 
(1)  (2)  VARIABLES 
AGREEMENT  AGREEMENT 
DGDPijt  -2.091 -0.744 
 (-2.76)***  (-2.74)*** 
Distij  -2.883 -1.026 
 (-5.71)***  (-5.86)*** 
Reltradij  0.481 0.165 
 (1.66)*  (1.645)* 
Stabpolit  2.947 0.814 
 (9.58)***  (16.59)*** 
Invijt  1.608 0.560 
 (5.81)***  (6.63)*** 
Constant 16.035   
 (4.98)***   
No. Observations  342  342 
Number of groups  19  19 
Correctly classified  86.75%   
ROC curve  0.9241   
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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   These results reveal that previous coefficient signs are preserved. We observe that the 
political stability variable and the foreign direct investment variable influenced more the 
conclusion of the association, confirming that the main objective of the association was the 
creation of a stable zone from a political and economic point of view. 
The foreign direct investment variable indicates that it was a common interest both for 
the investor country and the host country, given the potential gains for the two partners. 
Concerning the economic distance, it is a resistance factor against the association due to 
economies with a different level of development. The influence of traditional trade 
relationships is positive as shown before but its contribution is low.  
The gains from the signature of the association agreement are those associated to the 
advantages of the foreign direct investment and to a political stability. 
  
We now analyze in the next section what was the impact of the European agreement 
on exports between countries. 
  
5.         THE  IMPACT  OF  THE  ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT ON THE EXPORT
   PERFORMANCES 
    Our main goal here is to determine the effect of the association agreement on 
Romanian export performances, and to quantify its impact. We use the gravity model that 
permits to analyze the effects of regional agreements on trade flows between two countries
8. 
The trade flows of the country i towards the country j is a function of the offer of the exporter 
country and of the demand of the importer country and of the resistance of trade between 
countries. In other words the national incomes of two countries, transport costs (transaction 
costs) and regional agreements are the basic determinants of the model. 
   Various specifications of the model have been used by researchers to underline the 
role of regional blocks on trade exchanges
9. Concerning the dependent variable it is 
approximated in literature either by exports or imports. As for us, we use in our econometric 
estimation exports to determine the impact of the association agreement on the exports of 
Romania to EU.  
                                                 
8  Theoretical foundations of the gravity model are provided by Linnemann (1966), Helpman and Krugman 
(1985), Bergstrand (1985), Evenett and Keller (2002) etc. 
9 See for instance  Frankel , Stein and Wei (1995), Baldwin (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen ( 1995), Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2003),Winters and Soloaga (2001), Cheng and Wall (2005) etc.   10
In the first part of our study we showed that regional agreement variables are 
endogenous.  In the second part we try to determine the impact of association agreement on 
export performances, evidence from Romania. In particular, do European agreements have for 
main goal to increase the trade exchanges of their members and if so, how much?  
Our purpose here is not only to put in evidence a positive effect of the European 
association agreement on Romanian exports but also to quantify its influence on the increase 
of trade exchanges. A panel data approach is suitable because it allows to control for 
individual heterogeneity. Standard cross section estimates of the gravity model lead on the 
contrary to biased results of the bilateral trade volume because they do not permit to control 
for heterogeneity (see Baltagi, 2003).  
Besides, the use of panel data techniques enables to take specific effects (fixed or 
random effects) into account. The source of the endogeneity bias in the gravity model is 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. The choice of the retained method (Fixed Effects Model 
versus Random Effect Model) depends actually on two important things, its economic and 
econometric relevance
10. From an economic point of view there exist time invariant, 
unobservable and difficult to quantify variables, which can simultaneously influence some 
explanatory variables and trade volume. From an econometric point of view the inclusion of 
fixed effects is preferable to random effects because the rejection of the null assumption of no 
correlation of the unobservable characteristics with the agreement variable is less plausible.  
To eliminate the heterogeneity coming from unobserved variable correlated with some 
explanatory variables we use panel data models with fixed effects (Within, year, importer 
country). 
 
The estimated model is the following: 
Log(Xijt)=a0 + a1log(GDPit) + a2log(GDPjt) + a3log(DGDPijt) + a4log(Distij) + a5Accijt + 
a6log(Tchrijt) + a7dtime + a8dimporter +εijt                                                                                  (2)                          
, where Xijt are the exports from country i towards country j.  The explanatory variables used 
are the gross domestic product of the two partners GDPit, GDPjt, geographic distance Distij, 
the difference in development level DGDPijt, real exchange rate Tchrijt and the dichotomous 
                                                 
10 Baier and Bergstrand (2005).   11
variable agreement Accijt, time dummy dtime, partner dummy dimporter and the disturbance term 
εijt. 
The estimation period goes from 1987 to 2004, i.e. 18 years for a sample of 19 developed 
countries. 
Data are organized in panel with three dimensions: exporter, importers, and years. We 
estimate equation (2) in a logarithmic form to obtain a linear function and get variable 
elasticities.  
We apply different panel data estimation methods like Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(PLS), Fixed effect model (FEM), Random Effect Model (REM) and we compare the 
different results. 
The first regression is a classic one and the results are reported in table 2, column 1.  
In the other regressions, we use panel data techniques to control for heterogeneity due to a 
correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved characteristics in order to avoid 
getting biased results.  
The possible presence of multicolinearity among variables can bias econometric 
results. In particular, standard errors can be wrongly higher and/or the coefficients of some 
variables wrongly insignificant. In order to evaluate this risk of multicolinearity we calculate, 
the variance inflation factor (VIF). Literature indicates that a variance inflation factor value 
higher than 10 reveals the presence a multicolinearity requiring specific corrections (Gujarati, 
1995)
11.  
The econometric results show that the agreement positively influences exports 
between countries, and after the elimination of endogeneity using the fixed effects, the 
coefficient value of the agreement variable is close to 0.29. 
The estimation carried out at an aggregated level put in evidence the positive influence of the 
association agreement variable on the exports of Romania, which is a result in accordance 
with previous studies
12. Coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs in 
accordance with the gravity model. 
The robustness of the estimators obtained is crucial because it allows us to better 
quantify the impact of the association agreement on the exports of Romania towards EU 
market. This is one of the reasons why we use here a panel data approach which permits to 
                                                 
11 The calculation of this variance inflation factor (reported here) indicates the absence of multicolinearity. 
12 See for instance Buigez and Martinez (1991), Cheng and Wall (2005), Carrère C. (2006) , Winters and  
Soloaga (2001), Baier and Bergstrand (2005), Ghosh-Yamarick (2004).   12
identify time and country specific effects and to isolate them. Our model allows us to take the 
global propensity to export of a country into account (with the introduction of fixed or 
random effects). The introduction of temporal fixed effects permits to capture business cycles 
as well as the possible changes in the opening degree of all countries. The Hausman test 
(chi
2=30.99, Prob>chi
2=0.00) rejects the random effect model (REM) in favor of the fixed 
effects model (FEM). The introduction of (within, country and temporal) fixed effects has 
improved the quality of the estimations, the R
2 coefficient (from 0.84 to 0.95).  
The estimated coefficients of the FEM are different from those obtained with the REM 
(for instance for GDP, economic distance, or association agreement variables), which can be 
explained by the existence of a correlation between some explanatory variables and the 
bilateral specific effect.   13
 
Table 2: Estimation results 
 VARIABLES  OLS  RANDOM  WITHIN  OLS 
With 
Time 
effects 
OLS 
With 
Importer 
effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  xij Xij xij Xij  xij 
GDPit  2.131 2.876 2.645 2.211 2.645 
  (5.98)*** (12.04)***  (9.96)*** (3.89)*** (9.96)*** 
GDPjt  1.203 1.267 2.338 1.206 2.338 
  (34.21)*** (10.07)*** (5.53)*** (36.72)*** (5.53)*** 
Distij  -1.139 -1.422 0.000 -1.097 -1.523 
 (19.84)***  (-7.29)***  (.)  (-19.74)***  (-15.30)***
DGDPijt  0.071 0.402  0.169 0.06 0.169 
  (0.60)  (2.48)**  (0.58) (0.18) (0.58) 
Tchrijt  -0.133 -0.096 -0.091 -0.222 -0.091 
  (-4.82)*** (-3.14)*** (-2.78)*** (-7.35)*** (-2.78)*** 
Accijt  0.478 0.318 0.290 0.459 0.290 
  (12.88)***  (10.26)***  (9.23)*** (9.40)*** (9.23)*** 
dtime
(a      ****   
dimporter
(b       **** 
Constant -12.552  -17.027  -24.271  -12.82  -18.73 
 (-6.27)***  (-10.59)***  (-14.39)*** (-4.24)***  (-12.65)***
No.  Observations  342 342 342 342 342 
Number of groups  -  19  19  -  - 
R-squared  0.84 0.80 0.76 0.87 0.95 
VIF
13 1.38  -  -  1.75  3.86 
Ramsey RESET
14 
Prob>F 
2.66 
(0.05) 
- -  3.99 
(0.03) 
4.59 
(0.00) 
Breusch - Pagan / 
Cook – Weisberg 
15 
(before correction)  
Prob>chi2 
9.80 
(0.00) 
- -  12.77 
(0.00) 
22.41 
(0.00) 
Hausman 
16 
Prob>chi2 
- -  30.99 
(0.00) 
- - 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a) time dummy ; 
b) importer country dummy  
                                                 
13 - VIF test for multicolinearity calculates the variance inflation factors for the independent variables specified 
in the fitted model. 
14 Ramsey Reset test can be used to test for a multitude of specification problems including omitted variables 
Wooldrege (2002)    This test amounts to testing y = xb+zt+u and then testing t=0.  If no option is specified, 
powers of the fitted values are used for z and otherwise powers of the individual elements of x are used. 
15 Breusch  Pagan/Cook  Weisberg  test for heteroskedasticity performs a score (Lagrange multiplier) test for H: 
b=0 against multiplicative heteroskedasticity;  var(y) = s
2 exp( b1z1 + b2z2 + ... + bkzk). 
16 Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on the difference between the random effects and fixed effects 
estimates. Since a fixed effect model (FE) is consistent when ci and xit are correlated, but a random effect one 
(RE) is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random effects 
assumption. 
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Table 2 above clearly puts in evidence the decreasing impact of the European 
agreement variable from 0.48 in the basic model to 0.46 in the model with temporal effects 
and to 0.29 in the fixed effects model (within) and the pooled least squares with importer 
fixed effects.  For our estimation sample we can observe an insignificant impact of the 
temporal specific effects. In order to take the "geographic distance" into account, which is 
invariant over time we also performed an estimation with fixed importer effects. The 
estimated coefficients are almost identical with those obtained by the within estimator which 
tends to prove the robustness of the estimation. 
   Besides, the analysis of the agreement variable coefficient indicates a positive and 
significant impact of this variable on total exports and hence underlines the effects of EU 
trade policy through the influence of the European agreement on the exports of associated 
countries. 
6. CONCLUSION 
   Our study has underlined that European agreements are not exogenous and that in 
addition to economic motivations there also exist non-economic reasons to conclude an 
regional agreement. The EU enlargement to Central and Eastern countries is an unprecedented 
event that has provoked ample discussions. Concerning Romania  their first step towards 
European integration was the signature of the association agreement
17. In fact, association 
agreements legitimated the intention of candidate countries to become members of EU, which 
was confirmed after the application of these agreements, when these countries individually 
applied for joining EU. 
In our applied modeling we used two categories of variables, economic and non-
economic ones. Our econometric results using Romania data indicate that the association 
agreement was based on traditional trade relationships, on foreign direct investments, on the 
creation of a political stability and on the tendency of reduction of the economic distance 
between Romania and EU. In other words an economic convergence of Romania to European 
countries is an important desideratum for a successful European integration process. The 
higher the income level of partner countries is, the more countries tend to share economic 
characteristics, which increases their economic welfare.  
                                                 
17 Romania signed the association agreement in 1993 and ratified it in 1995. 
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The foreign direct investments have strongly influenced the association decision as 
expected in the literature dealing with the gains for the investor and host countries. Moreover, 
the fact that political stability is one of the main factors influencing the association agreement 
leads us to conclude that EU enlargement was due in the beginning essentially to political 
reasons. 
Geographic distance and the difference of level of income have a negative influence 
on the association decision as expected in literature.  
To conclude the estimation of the quantitative impact of the association agreement on 
trade flows had a positive but moderated role which explains the political dimension of the 
association agreement on the first stage of Romania adhesion to EU. From an economic point 
of view the effect of regionalization on the trade of a transition country had a positive impact. 
From an econometric point of view the use of panel data methods with fixed effects is 
appropriate for obtaining unbiased and efficient parameter estimates. 
Indeed, the association agreement to EU is endogenous and not exogenous and EU 
support policies have had a positive effect leading to an increase of Romanian exports 
towards the European market. Finally countries endogenously select to conclude an 
association agreement.  
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